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Peering into the future: British Conservative leaders and the problem of national 
renewal, 1942-5 
 
Robert Crowcroft 
Abstract 
 
This article excavates how some key Conservative leaders conceptualised the problem of ‘the 
future’ in the final stages of the Second World War. It contends that the mental map 
employed by senior Conservative for navigating the challenges of post-war national renewal 
has remained significantly misunderstood. The article conducts a close reading of 
Conservative positions on a range of issues – from economic modernisation and 
constitutional propriety to geopolitical tensions – and highlights some previously neglected 
dimensions to domestic political debate.  It concludes that the arguments developed by 
Conservative leaders were more sophisticated and coherent than has often been recognised. 
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Political conflict in Britain during the latter half of the Second World War has long attracted 
the attention of historians.1 A sizeable body of work has appeared, principally examining the 
impact of Sir William Beveridge’s landmark study of state provision published in December 
1942. After the release of Social Insurance and Allied Services – popularly known as the 
Beveridge report – for the remainder of the war the challenge of securing national renewal 
was the issue around which politics came to revolve. Many scholars have traced a thread 
from the publication of the report to the landslide victory of the Labour party at the July 1945 
general election. The problem of national renewal divided the coalition government of 
Winston Churchill, for Labour and the Conservatives possessed somewhat different visions 
of the future, and – still more so – how that future might be realised. The explanation for 
Labour’s success has generated a rich corpus of literature.2 That work continues to be 
expanded.3 
This article develops a fresh perspective on political debate in Britain at a crucial moment of 
national and international transition. Its purpose is futurology: it excavates how some 
important Conservative ministers – individuals who made decisions and shaped policy – 
discerned the shape of the future. The inescapable fact is that Conservative positions in the 
latter half of the war have been the subject of much misunderstanding, even outright myth. 
This has centred on the belief that, because of doctrinal scepticism towards the Beveridge 
report, Conservative leaders sought to evade the issue of national renewal as much as 
possible – in contrast to Labour’s eager commitment to the report. Indeed, that was one of a 
whole series of wartime ‘myths’, which, as Andrew Thorpe has argued, were created by 
contemporaries for instrumental purposes yet rapidly became ‘conventional wisdoms’.4 
Crucially, those ‘conventional wisdoms’ shaped not only popular views but have long 
impacted the historiographical agenda as well. But the myths surrounding the Conservatives 
and renewal were generally social democratic in origin and orientation; there was, and 
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remains, a strong underlying preference for the Beveridge report, and Labour, as being on the 
side of modernity and ‘progress’.5 In seeking to address this, the article reconstructs what key 
Conservative ministers saw when they peered into what Churchill called ‘the mists of the 
future’.6 It considers the challenges that they anticipated would confront the post-war British 
state, as well as the priorities they identified in tackling them. In doing so, the article widens 
the discussion about national renewal beyond the parameters established by the Beveridge 
report and examines the themes that leading Conservatives themselves deemed most 
significant.  
The failure to fully excavate the outlook of Conservative leaders at a moment of profound 
challenge to the liberal state is odd, because several scholars have examined Conservative 
responses to Beveridge.7 Broadly speaking, historians have perceived Conservative reactions 
to renewal as awkward: opposing the Beveridge report for its expense (or principles), but 
being unwilling to say so and thus working quietly to impede progress. Churchill’s own 
intermittent interest in reform, consumed as he was by the war, has frequently been noted.8 
Importantly, however, the Conservative reaction has conventionally been considered 
alongside, and thus measured against, Labour’s vision. The outcome has been that historians 
have compared it to that of Labour, and found it wanting – just as the public did in 1945. 
Moreover – and this is vital – such a view risks conflating the Beveridge report with national 
renewal more broadly. This was an association that Conservatives energetically disputed – 
and therein lays the point of this article. 
In fact, the reaction of leading Conservatives ministers, and their subsequent thinking about 
national renewal, was better developed than has often been realised. The article will show 
that they framed the issue of renewal within a set of coordinates quite different from those of 
their coalition partners. Their arguments hinged on finance, trade, defence and foreign policy. 
Science, technology and constitutional propriety were also crucial. We therefore need to think 
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imaginatively and move beyond the confines of a historiography shaped disproportionately 
by Beveridge and affection for the Labour-led social democratic order which emerged from 
the war. In addition, there was a critical temporal component at work here, too.9 Wartime 
political debate was intensely temporal. Labour’s positions, and campaigning, promised the 
public an appealing encounter with eternity. Finality was at the core of the party’s message 
by 1945. The worldview developed by senior Conservative ministers, in contrast, did not 
elevate its horizons much beyond the here-and-now. When was often more important than 
what. As the article will show, the Conservative analysis was consistently framed by two 
things: priorities and timing.  
Conducting a close reading of Conservative positions, the article reconstructs the languages 
and conceptual vocabularies used by some Conservative politicians in imagining an uncertain 
future. Ewen Green’s effort to understand the logic of Conservative positions and show how 
they defined the problems they faced was important in constructing an intellectual history of 
the party; his work underlined the need to treat the Conservatives’ ‘map of the world’ with 
appropriate scrutiny.10 The period between 1942 and 1945 benefits from a similar exercise in 
mental cartography.11 This article places particular emphasis upon the role of Sir Kingsley 
Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer from May 1940 until his sudden death in September 
1943. A veteran Conservative minister, Wood has been largely overlooked by scholars12 but 
in fact was a key actor in wartime politics. Between 1940-1 he played a crucial role in 
stabilising the coalition, and establishing its political legitimacy, through the construction of a 
‘fair’ financial policy to pay for the war.13 In late 1942, he was at the fore of attempts to 
avoid damaging rows within the government over the Beveridge report. And when this failed, 
Wood took the lead in developing the Conservatives’ own position on national renewal, 
partly through a dialogue with the Beveridge report and partly through arguing that there was 
much more to be considered. This was a key moment, for Wood’s vision of problems and 
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possibilities in renewal endured after his death. Indeed, it arguably determined the posture 
adopted by the Conservative leadership down to the 1945 election. 
This analysis requires a shift in focus from much of the existing literature. It necessitates 
separating Conservative arguments from those of Labour and treating them seriously on their 
own terms. This is surprisingly challenging. For many contemporaries, ‘unquestioning 
acceptance of Beveridge’ became ‘a litmus test’ of basic ‘decency’.14 Even among scholars, 
there exists a robust Labour-welfarist orthodoxy partly rooted in the fact that many historians 
have, directly or otherwise, expressed sympathy for the Beveridge report.15 Recent work by 
David Edgerton has argued the case for a break from ‘welfarist’ accounts of the war, and 
while those accounts perhaps have more to recommend them than he allows, nevertheless his 
point is an important one.16 From a different angle, Ben Jackson has also demonstrated the 
fruitful possibilities of rethinking established assumptions about the expression of political 
ideas in this period.17 In addition, there has always been a powerful historiographical 
tendency to approach the issue examined in the article through the lens of Addison’s wartime 
‘consensus’. While the arguments over consensus have rightly been central to the 
historiography of wartime politics for forty years, it is unsatisfactory to reduce all possible 
problems to the debate about whether or not there was a ‘consensus’. Here, we should 
perform a quite deliberate act of separation. To properly contextualise the Conservative 
position on national renewal, we need to broaden the focus from the themes Labour identified 
and campaigned on to those which Conservatives deemed crucial. The leaders of the largest 
party in the coalition flatly rejected the notion that Social Insurance and Allied Services 
should determine the parameters of debate. Rather than plotting this along a simple ‘pro’- or 
‘anti’-Beveridge axis, then, what is required is a more nuanced, multi-layered analysis. 
Instead of simplifying matters, the article aims to complicate them by showing that what 
Conservatives were arguing about was often quite different to their opponents. Several 
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dialogues were occurring simultaneously. The tying together of Beveridge and national 
renewal is central to the framing of what Edgerton termed the ‘social democratic 
historiography of Britain between 1939 and 1951’.18 While that historiography has merit, it is 
not really reflective of the position as Conservative leaders defined it between 1942 and 
1945. 
Contrary to narrow mythologies still recycled with regularity,19 the reality is that leading 
Conservatives engaged seriously, and in depth, with the problem of national renewal. They 
developed the outlines of a clear strategy. Priorities were established, problems identified, 
and alternatives weighed. Thus, while many in the party were certainly sceptical about, and 
even hostile to, the notion of major social reform,20 others – especially senior Conservatives, 
those with the power of decision-making – were more flexible, recognising the need to 
respond to Beveridge and Labour.21 Some were enthusiastic about building a better future. 
The work of R.A. Butler has usually been pointed to as an example of constructive 
conservatism,22 but as the article will suggest, the reality is more complex. Wood and his 
successor at the Treasury, Sir John Anderson, were more significant.23 Anderson, though 
ostensibly a ‘National’ MP, was in practice a Conservative.24 Meanwhile Churchill’s 
anxieties about the Soviet Union occupied a central place in his views on national renewal. 
Drawing on a range of papers, the article recreates the outlines of their vision. Whilst any 
commitment to implement the Beveridge report in full after the war – let alone during it, as 
Labour demanded – was avoided, from late 1942 key figures still began to think carefully 
about the management of finite resources upon the cessation of hostilities, how prosperity 
was to be restored while costly public services were expanded, and what the international 
landscape would look like. Outlining this worldview has several components. Some 
significant documentary evidence, especially papers drawn up in early 1943, has not been 
properly examined in previous literature. Yet these papers shaped Conservative strategy for 
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the remainder of the war and force us to rethink events. Moreover there is a need to fully 
integrate the international, particularly Soviet, dimension within the analysis. Economic 
assessments of reform were shaped from the beginning by a range of acute geopolitical 
anxieties. And because of the failure to properly contextualise earlier developments, the 
Conservatives’ much-criticised 1945 manifesto has also frequently mystified. In fact, this 
mystification is easily resolvable so long as we do not take the Beveridge report as our 
lodestar. 
 
I 
 
In the judgement of virtually all Conservatives, life in the immediate post-war years was 
likely to be defined by prolonged hardship and economic instability. There was little 
confidence that this could be avoided. Conflict with the Axis powers had left the country 
facing large debts and dislocation; problems of demobilisation would be compounded by the 
collapse of international trade. Recovery was likely to prove slow, and success was uncertain. 
This was the prism through which senior Conservative ministers, working at the sharp end of 
policy, viewed the world. Churchill was always quick to dismiss any hope that the end of the 
war would lead to ‘Utopia’ or ‘Eldorado’.25 His colleagues shared the same sentiment.26 The 
activities of the government’s leading Conservatives must therefore be understood in these 
terms. As alluded to earlier, there was also an important – if often unspoken – temporal 
dimension to the debate, too. Historians have recently begun to engage with the significance 
of ‘time’ in the minds of politicians.27 For senior Conservatives, getting the timing of reform 
measures right was significant. This was one area where Conservatives gave more thought to 
reform than their rivals. Aware of the huge popularity of Beveridge’s scheme for an 
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expanded welfare state that would offer coverage ‘from cradle to grave’, the Labour 
leadership desired the coalition to pass legislation to put the reforms outlined by Beveridge 
into immediate effect at the end of the war; many in the party wanted them implemented even 
while the conflict continued. Senior Conservatives, in contrast, favoured a gradual and 
incremental process. That would, moreover, depend on the recovery of trade and the 
architecture of international security. The importance of this was manifested in the fact that 
many of the Conservative arguments developed here were framed with explicit reference to a 
temporal situation. While it would be naïve to hold that procrastination did not serve a party-
political purpose in the coalition, nevertheless the same vision was offered to the electorate in 
1945. As such, we should conclude that leading figures did think carefully about timeframes 
and the problem of prioritising between competing claims for resources.  
Even before his report was published in December 1942, Beveridge spent several months 
hinting to the press that he was to propose a major expansion of the welfare state.28  His leaks 
aggravated politicians from both parties. The man himself was widely disliked.29 He was an 
energetic self-publicist engaged in an obviously political campaign to disrupt the government. 
Indeed, to some extent Beveridge himself was the architect of his own mythology, his 
constant appearances in the press calculated to ensure that national renewal quickly came to 
be seen as indistinguishable from Social Insurance and Allied Services.30 
The first Conservative to grapple with the issues raised by the report was the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Kingsley Wood. Over the next few months Wood contributed more than any 
other Conservative to shaping the party’s stance on post-war reconstruction. A former ally of 
Chamberlain, he had thrown his weight behind Churchill in May 1940 and been rewarded 
with the Treasury.31 From there he crafted a radical, and politically sustainable, method of 
financing the war effort.32 This afforded him an important role in coalition management.33 
Wood possessed sensitive political antennae and quickly recognised the disruptive potential 
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of the Beveridge proposals. Paying a visit to the Chancellor on 26 August 1942, Butler found 
him ruminating that the publication of Social Insurance and Allied Services would be ‘the big 
event of the year’. 34 He feared that ‘it would not go well’. Wood remarked it would be best 
‘if Beveridge came out with as many high-minded and fantastic suggestions as possible’. 
Yet Wood boasted a record of commitment to progressive causes – in 1918 he earned a 
knighthood for running a national petition calling upon the government to establish a 
Ministry of Health, served as Neville Chamberlain’s deputy at Health for five years between 
1924-29, and was himself Minister of Health between 1935-38. He told Butler that the 
country would ‘need’ social reform after the war, and asked him to ‘proceed energetically’ 
with his ideas for education. It would be an over-simplification to conclude that the 
Chancellor opposed the report because he was hostile to progressive legislation. Rather, his 
objection was a sense that Beveridge himself was being less than straight. As Butler left that 
evening, Wood ‘warned me … to take great care with Beveridge’.35 When Beveridge 
presented his proposals to the media as being easily affordable, the Chancellor’s hackles were 
raised; he wrote to the prime minister complaining that ‘politics are already beginning to be 
played about this report’.36 But both Wood and Churchill recognised that it was ‘not worth 
having a row’ by trying to silence Beveridge.37 The Chancellor was wary of the government 
being pressured into giving a premature endorsement of the reforms. Privately, he reckoned 
that it would be ‘months’ before a considered judgement could be reached.38 
Between November 1942 and June 1943, the Chancellor therefore sought to head off 
problems within the coalition by initiating a cross-party dialogue about the future relationship 
between state and citizen. This section conducts a careful reading of the positions adopted 
and selects recurrent themes and rhetoric in Wood’s arguments in order to build up an 
understanding of the worldview that took shape among Conservative decision-makers. 
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The first step was to try and win the support of the Labour leadership for a cautious attitude 
toward Social Insurance and Allied Services. Wood approached a Labour minister, Sir 
William Jowitt – the head of the government’s Reconstruction Problems Committee – and 
pressed him to take the lead in making the case against any formal state commitment to 
implement the report in full. Jowitt took up the cause, and on 14 November circulated a five-
page memorandum to the War Cabinet in which he acknowledged that Wood had ‘asked me 
to say a word of warning on the subject of finance’.39 This document bore the stark heading 
‘Reconstruction is not the framing of Utopias’ and stressed that Britain lacked the resources 
to restore prosperity while meeting all conceivable claims for reconstruction funds. 
Importantly, it called upon the coalition to determine a clear ‘order of priorities’ by which 
planning would be guided.40 
Warning that ‘we cannot do everything at once’ – a temporally-situated argument in itself – 
Jowitt’s paper was remarkably similar to those produced in subsequent months by the 
Chancellor. It outlined a range of options for funding – defence, demobilisation, employment, 
food and raw materials, controls, housing, foreign aid, economic growth, social security, 
health, town and countryside planning, agriculture, forestry, utilities, and education – which 
were exactly those later used by the Chancellor. It seems reasonable to intuit that not only had 
Wood put Jowitt up to writing the memorandum, but he also had a hand in its contents. Days 
later, Jowitt wrote to Churchill and offered to try and ‘restrain Sir William Beveridge from 
expounding his report or advocating the adoption of its recommendations’.41 
In seeking to work through, rather than against, the Conservatives’ partners – pressing a 
Labour minister to be the first to raise the issue of finite resources – it is logical to conclude 
that Wood was hoping to enlist that party’s backing. When the War Cabinet discussed 
Jowitt’s memorandum on 19 November, Wood was the first to speak and declared that 
‘Surely this is OK … we can’t go too fast’.42 He reiterated Jowitt’s call for the parties to work 
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together to determine priorities, suggesting the formation of a ‘committee of ministers’. 
Despite the enthusiasm of Labour leaders for the report, the War Cabinet agreed that an 
immediate commitment to Beveridge’s programme was inadvisable.43 
Yet while trying to avoid the government dividing along party lines, Wood had developed a 
private view of the Beveridge report. He sent Churchill ‘preliminary reflections of a critical 
character’, in a memorandum marked ‘Secret: for PM only’. This suggested that while ‘a 
general overhaul of the social insurances is no doubt very desirable … the scheme regarded 
as a whole … involves an impracticable financial commitment’.44 ‘Particular proposals’ 
might be adopted, but whether they could be ‘reasonably’ afforded must be ‘the subject of 
close study’. The document went on to express concern about each of Beveridge’s core 
assumptions, particularly whether unemployment ‘can and will be substantially eliminated’, 
and suggested that the envisaged state medical service would prove more expensive than 
indicated, with Beveridge ‘offer[ing] no real solution’ to the question of funding. The paper 
also warned that taxation would become damagingly high: 
Will 4/8 in the £ of the national income (or more if prosperity is not attained) be tolerable at all in peace? This 
grim picture is not lacking in justification, for we shall be bearing … the cost of armed forces of considerable 
power, the burden of debt of two world wars (£500m per annum or more), together with the burden of pre-war 
social services (apart from the new “social security”) practically without parallel in the world. Is this the time to 
assume that the general taxpayer has a bottomless purse?
45
 
This argument indicated that reform was necessary, but implementing the full contents of the 
Beveridge report could represent too heavy a burden given that government would 
simultaneously be confronted with the urgency of restoring economic competitiveness and 
retaining military power sufficient to police the defeated states. The Chancellor concluded 
that 
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Many in this country have persuaded themselves that the cessation of hostilities will mark the opening of the 
Golden Age (many were so persuaded last time also). However this may be, the time for declaring a dividend on 
the profits of the Golden Age is the time when those profits have been realised in fact, not merely in 
imagination.
46
 
Charting the debate in terms of whether political parties were pro- or anti-Beveridge perhaps 
risks misinterpreting the developing attitude of Conservative leaders to the task of rebuilding 
Britain. The Chancellor was anxious to link aspirations to resources, while avoiding what he 
saw as unwarranted optimism. He was also cognisant of the grave difficulties in 
implementing reform that had been experienced at the end of the First World War. The fact 
that even in private correspondence there was no doctrinal hostility to social security is 
significant. Rather, this seems to have been a debate about priorities. The themes identified 
by Wood were to shape Conservative attitudes until 1945. 
 
II 
 
The hope of developing a cross-party approach was dashed by the publication of the 
Beveridge report in December. Popular opinion was taken with its vision and the document 
quickly became a national phenomenon. There are few parallels to the effect it had on the 
public mood, something confirmed by the contemporary work of Mass Observation.47 ‘The 
world as we knew it has gone for good’.48 Very quickly, ‘the great majority’ of the people 
held ‘definite views’ on social security.49 With opinions polls showing eighty-seven per cent 
backing for the report, the Labour movement was swept along in its wake. Labour came out 
in favour of an unequivocal endorsement of the entire report, as well as a commitment to 
bring it into effect before the end of the war.50 But for Conservative leaders, the Beveridge 
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report initiated a quite different intellectual process than it did for Labour (or the public); 
social security was merely one of several considerations. This is where we need to broaden 
the parameters beyond those set by Beveridge and Labour. In early 1943 Wood therefore 
became more assertive in articulating a separate Conservative approach. 
On 14 January, the Chancellor brought two detailed memoranda before the War Cabinet. 
These crucial papers represent the strongest expression of Conservative attitudes on 
reconstruction produced during the war. They were also perhaps the most confrontational 
political documents crafted between 1940 and 1945. Yet, surprisingly, historians have not 
examined them in any detail. This is a striking omission. 
The first document was the more overtly political of the two. Authored by Wood himself, this 
was just two pages long but poured cold water over hopes for rapid social improvement: 
Whilst I believe we can look forward with confidence to the future of our country, it is obvious that in the post-
war period we shall be faced with problems even more anxious than in the time of war itself. It would therefore 
be but prudent to avoid at this time large and continuing commitments unless there is an overwhelming case for 
them.
51
 
Moreover there were other ‘strongly pressed claims’ on the limited funds that would be 
available after the war. Wood took the opportunity to set out his own sense of priorities. 
Defence expenditure to maintain international peace would be ‘rightly demanded above all 
else’. The defeated states would need to be occupied and further conflict deterred through the 
long-term retention of large armed forces, underpinned by an activist strategic posture. Next 
came the ‘full restoration’ of trade, without which the ‘fullest employment’ could not be 
achieved; the paper argued that exports would need to grow by 50 per cent over the pre-war 
level, while ‘all sections of the community’ expected wartime taxation to be substantially 
reduced. Wood wrote that ‘The cost of new social schemes and services, however beneficent 
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and desirable, must be balanced against these facts’.52 The potential avenues for funding 
identified in Jowitt’s earlier memorandum were reiterated, and the government once again 
challenged to ‘assess these claims and determine some order of priorities’. Wood felt 
housing and employment to be the most pressing claims for money.53 
 
This repeated emphasis on priorities is important. The Chancellor had set out what would 
become the long-term Conservative position on reform: defence and economic renewal 
needed to come first, and beyond that an order of social priorities must be agreed. Turning to 
the Beveridge report itself, the memorandum argued that all of the assumptions on which 
Social Insurance and Allied Services had estimated the cost of the proposed measures were 
problematic. It suggested that unemployment could conceivably exceed the 8.5 per cent 
allowed for, that rates of benefit would have to be raised to keep pace with the national 
subsistence minimum, that high taxation may prove unpopular and reduce living standards, 
and that increased national insurance burdens on employers might make the difference 
between success and failure in competitive export markets.54 Wood maintained that if any of 
Beveridge’s assumptions were proven wrong, the financial viability of his scheme would 
collapse. 
 
The memorandum was accompanied by a longer, more detailed paper drawn up by Treasury 
officials. This extended over six pages and assessed the costs of Beveridge’s plans in detail.55 
Significantly, the department objected that it was being asked to commit future taxpayers to a 
permanent burden with little likelihood of controlling the associated expense. Utilising 
Beveridge’s own assumptions about costs, taxable national income three years after the war, 
a successful export drive and unemployment levels, the Treasury also assumed that there 
would be no reduction of working hours in peacetime. It calculated that this might yield a 
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budget surplus of £925m after existing commitments were met. That would need to cover the 
costs of the armed forces necessary to pursue a forward-facing British grand strategy 
(projected at £500m p.a.), the resumption of the sinking fund (£100m p.a.), reductions in 
taxation, new social services, and any other measures such as assistance to export industries 
or to combat unemployment.56 The paper concluded that the Beveridge reforms were 
unaffordable if economic competitiveness was to be restored at the same time. As such there 
was little sense in committing to legislation when the availability of resources remained 
uncertain. Faced with these arguments, the War Cabinet agreed to continue studying the 
report.57 But rumours of Conservative pessimism were soon leaked to the press.58 
 
For the purposes of this article, the financial validity of the Chancellor’s assumptions is 
unimportant. Politicking was an important part of the situation, with Beveridge himself 
‘having the fun of my life’ and relishing the fact that the report ‘may bring down a 
government’.59 What is significant is that a clear Conservative line of argument had been 
developed and tested. There was an obvious tactical objective to Wood’s intervention: in the 
context of escalating enthusiasm for Beveridge, it resembled a bid to discredit his report and 
bury it under a mass of statistics. Yet there was also more than that – an anxiety that public 
debate assumed that all things were possible upon the termination of military hostilities. 
Wood worried that ‘the contrary argument does not so often find expression’.60 Conservatives 
of all tendencies – from activists and MPs worried about creeping socialism to those 
ministers who looked more favourably upon progressive legislation – feared that the end of 
the war would expose the weakness of Britain’s position and usher in a rapid decline unless 
urgent steps were taken. Within this bleak vision of the future, the problem was that the 
Beveridge report and its advocates were wagering on a benign global environment, low 
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unemployment and economic renewal – as well as the fact that the growth of national income 
would keep pace with increased demands. This was considered doubtful. 
 
The cautious public position that Conservative leaders imposed on the government struck the 
wrong note with the electorate. One Mass Observation diarist detected ‘sinister shadows of 
post-war trickery’.61 Churchill was certainly culpable; he had long failed to give a lead, either 
because of his focus on the war or because he preferred to leave this problem to others. Yet 
emphasising the presentational missteps of Conservatives – for instance Anderson and 
Wood’s famously disastrous performance in the House of Commons debate on social security 
in February 1943, during which they failed to stress that the coalition was keen to pursue 
reformist measures where feasible, instead concentrating on financial uncertainty – overlooks 
the fact that the position taking shape was not one of outright hostility to reform. John 
Anderson – assisted by Oliver Lyttelton, Jowitt, and Bevin – had worked to craft a ‘joint 
motion’ from the coalition partners. This recommended that the government indicate to 
Parliament its acceptance of a ‘universal’ health service, an expansion of welfare and full 
employment, while tethering this to the issue of cost.62 At this point Churchill finally 
intervened, and, in doing so, added an interesting component to the Conservative position. He 
wrote that ‘the rescue of the millions’ was ‘essential’ to ‘any post-war scheme of national 
betterment’, but 
We cannot however initiate the legislation now or commit ourselves to the expenditure involved. That can only 
be done by a responsible Government and a House of Commons refreshed by contact with the people … We 
must not forget that we are a Parliament in the eighth year … We have no right whatever to tie the hands of 
future Parliaments in regard to social matters which are their proper province. I could not as Prime Minister be 
responsible at this stage for binding my successor whoever he may be without knowledge of the conditions 
under which he will undertake his responsibilities.
63 
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This was an interesting supplementation to the Conservative argument. It represented, at root, 
a constitutional case: that there was no mandate for the Beveridge reforms and restricting the 
freedom of future governments was inappropriate. When that is set alongside finance, trade 
and defence we can discern the outlines of a mental map quite different from that of Labour. 
Wood took up this baton, arguing in the War Cabinet that the coalition ‘must reserve to the 
government of the day the final decision’.64 The Cabinet Secretary recorded him as saying 
‘that is what every government does. What’s wrong with that?’65  
Subsequent cross-party disputes in 1943 have been well-documented by historians and 
generated more heat than light, with Labour ministers pressing for the government to make a 
‘best forecast’ of economic conditions at the end of the war and proceed on that basis,66 while 
Churchill thought that the matter had become ‘purely political’.67 But in July, Wood 
produced a memorandum which, significantly, relied exclusively on making connections 
between temporal arguments and the language of constitutional propriety. Italicising phrases 
that stressed these themes, this paper reiterated that decisions after the war would have to be 
made in light of the circumstances ‘which might prevail at that time’; responsibility could 
only rest with the ministry ‘of the day’, and it was ‘their duty alone’ to take such decisions; 
nothing could be implemented ‘until the end of the war’; and ‘when this plan has been 
shaped it will have to be presented be to the country’.68 The language chosen and concepts 
used seems crucial. When asked in 1961 whether the principles of the Beveridge report had 
been accepted on ‘both sides of the Cabinet’, Attlee replied ‘Oh yes. [But] there was the 
question of when it should come in, of course, which was not very easy’.69 
If Beveridge had fixed the terms of debate for the Labour party, Wood provided them for the 
Conservatives. This framework was substantially wider than public services or welfare; 
indeed, those themes were often secondary. Some within the party had been thinking about 
post-war issues throughout 1942, but made relatively little impact.70 In contrast, the 
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Chancellor’s views shaped the attitude of his party down to the 1945 election. Historians 
should perhaps take these arguments – particularly their strikingly consistent emphasis on 
timing, priorities, defence and propriety – more seriously than has previously been the case. 
Those themes dominated Conservative strategy and offer insights into how senior figures 
proposed to pursue national renewal. Backbench and rank-and-file opinion were frequently 
hostile to the expansion of social services, but a more nuanced approach had been adopted at 
the upper levels of government. 
 
III 
 
On the evening of 21 March, Churchill broadcast to the nation over BBC radio and publicly 
stated the Conservative position for the first time. This was a significant moment because the 
nexus of anxieties that had been expressed behind closed doors was now revealed to the 
electorate. The prime minister spent three weeks drafting this speech – an indication that he 
recognised the acute sensitivities that were developing over visions of the future – and 
consulted John Maynard Keynes on the content.71 Churchill explained to his listeners that he 
intended to ‘peer through the mists of the future’.72 Warning of attempts to ‘coerce’ the 
government into making pledges ‘in conditions which no one can foresee and which may be 
years ahead, to impose great new expenditures on the state without any relation to the 
circumstances which might prevail at that time’, he advised that this would turn the 
‘parliamentary system’ into a collection of ‘pledge-bound delegates’. ‘Nothing would be 
easier for me than to make any number of promises to get the immediate response of cheap 
cheers’ by telling ‘all kinds of fairy tales’. This was a reiteration of the dual themes of timing 
and political probity. It paralleled an argument he had made privately to Cabinet colleagues: 
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‘Nothing would be more dangerous than for people to feel cheated because they had been led 
to expect attractive schemes which turn out to be economically impossible’.73 Churchill 
expressed a further temporal anxiety in that a declining birth rate would leave taxpayers 
unable to fund social services within ‘twenty to thirty years’.74 
 
The prime minister laid heavy emphasis on the future geopolitics of Europe and the world, 
and how this would necessitate a security alliance between the victorious states to ‘garrison’ 
the ‘guilty countries’ and deter future wars. Before that even became possible, however, 
Churchill reminded his audience that upon the defeat of Germany a long, bloody struggle to 
conquer Japan would follow as ‘our first and supreme task’. Meanwhile the ‘stupendous 
business’ of rebuilding European stability would represent a further arduous and protracted 
duty. ‘Widespread famine’ across the continent was an immediate danger, but the real threat 
was the rapid restoration of national rivalries in a power vacuum. Only the ongoing 
collaboration of ‘Britain, the United States and Russia’ could overawe potential challengers 
to peace and avert this. 
 
Though the prime minister was clearly most invested in military issues, he used the speech to 
publicly propose a ‘four-year plan’ for domestic reconstruction. This would ‘cover five or six 
large measures’. Churchill wanted the ‘extension’ of social insurance to be the first ‘great 
advance’, while food production might be regenerated, a ‘national health service’ established, 
and education become ‘broader’ to secure ‘equal opportunity for all’. Meanwhile taxation 
must be reduced and ‘vigorous private enterprise’ revived, exports had to increase and the 
demand for consumer goods would return. These demands might limit the reconstruction 
measures that could be immediately afforded, but in restoring long-term prosperity they 
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would ensure that the cost was sustainable. Churchill’s summary of his position was ‘no 
promises [while the war continued] but every preparation’.75 
 
A widespread public perception that the prime minister was not focused on domestic affairs 
proved a boon for the Labour party. Mass Observation found a feeling of popular 
‘estrangement’ and the ‘strong’ impression ‘that MPs are not really representing the country’s 
interests, nor leading the country towards a better [future]’.76 But, nevertheless, Churchill had 
restated the approach developed by Wood and – in a national broadcast – adopted it as that of 
the Conservatives. International stability and British economic competitiveness would come 
first, but goals for reconstruction not dissimilar to those favoured by the Conservatives’ 
opponents were also on the agenda. 
When the development of this position is properly scrutinised, and not simply compared to 
that of Labour,77 it therefore becomes problematic to depict Churchill as insincere on reform; 
he had, after all, been one of the architects of the New Liberalism. Rather, as Richard Toye 
stressed, the issue was that domestic debates represented a distraction from the ‘main task’.78 
Churchill told the socialist intellectual Harold Laski that engaging with the latter’s detailed 
plans for reform was ‘entirely beyond my share of life and strength’.79 The attitude 
articulated by the prime minister and Chancellor hinged on the belief that delivering peace, 
prosperity and reform would necessitate a complex balancing-act. 
Other senior Conservative ministers began to echo this, developing the theme that an 
economic renaissance was necessary. The Minister of Production, Oliver Lyttelton, argued in 
the War Cabinet that Beveridge offered only an ‘incomplete approach’ to the achievement of 
‘social security’. As Social Insurance and Allied Services was not a blueprint for economic 
prosperity, ‘it does not touch the essential problem of creating the background of reasonable 
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stability [in terms of trade] which any such scheme requires for its success’.80 Without a plan 
for economic renewal, the report was lacking its ‘proper setting’. Lyttelton and Anderson 
soon began pressing Whitehall departments to focus on industrial research and development 
as part of the drive to rebuild prosperity.81 As Edgerton has shown, an interest in 
‘modernisation’ was ubiquitous at this time, and not restricted to any one party.82 And after 
Wood’s death in September 1943, it was Lindemann who took up the task of seeking to 
establish a hierarchy of priorities. He set before the War Cabinet a memorandum that 
grappled with the pace of demobilisation, whether the essential work order was to be 
maintained, the balance between producing exports and domestic consumer goods, and the 
apparatus of rationing.83 Lindemann proposed that the introduction of measures of ‘social 
betterment’ should be explicitly linked to the rejuvenation of industry within Churchill’s 
‘four-year plan’.84 The Conservatives’ Central Committee on Post-War Reconstruction 
echoed this in a report on demobilisation.85 In response to Lindemann, Churchill resolved that 
the ‘most urgent’ priorities during the transition at the end of the war were ‘(a) 
demobilisation… (b) increased food production… (c) the resumption of the export trade … 
(d) the general turn-over of industry from war to peace and … (e) employment’.86 
Implementing the Beveridge report was not identified as an immediate task. 
 
IV 
 
In properly contextualising the Conservative position on reform, we should reiterate that it 
was underpinned by a series of geopolitical and strategic assessments. This international 
backdrop is crucial, for it impacted Conservative decision-making in the domestic sphere in 
important ways. It constituted a key part of the mental landscape of Conservative leaders in 
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ways that have not often been recognised in literature fixated with Beveridge and social 
democracy. We have already seen Wood’s warnings about the long-term cost of powerful 
armed forces sufficiently strong to deter another World War. Churchill had expanded upon 
this, making the theme central to his BBC speech. 
The prime minister (and informed opinion on both sides of the Atlantic) expected the defeat 
of Japan to require two years after victory over Germany, and (in 1943) proceeded on the 
assumption that the war would end around early 1948.87 Though the public had always felt 
detached from the conflict with Japan,88 Churchill was concerned with the likelihood of a 
long struggle to subdue the Japanese. Even in the spring of 1945, he expended a great deal of 
energy seeking to avert the collapse of the coalition government and ensure its continuation 
until victory over Japan.89 When we consider that most believed the Second World War 
would last for a considerable period beyond the fall of the Third Reich, it is possible to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of Churchill’s reluctance to press ahead with a 
programme of social reforms in 1943. The sudden effect of nuclear weaponry on Japan in the 
summer of 1945 was impossible to foresee; as such, for Churchill and his allies the 
preparation of schemes that would not be implemented until late in the decade had an air of 
unreality. In excavating their decision-making, this needs to be taken into account. Moreover, 
it had long been assumed by leaders in Allied capitals that, even when the Axis powers were 
indeed defeated, international politics thereafter would likely centre on the Allies watching 
for, and deterring, any attempt by Germany and Japan to re-emerge as a threat. Churchill had 
been planning for this as early as the Atlantic Charter in 1941,90 and discussed the imperative 
to ‘garrison’ the Axis powers in his March 1943 broadcast. Meanwhile a reading of the 
United Nations Charter in its proper historical context makes clear that it explicitly sought to 
establish a traditional concert of powers through which the Allies would actively police the 
international system, particularly what the Charter termed the ‘enemy states’.91 It would be a 
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dangerous world in which Britain would bear many burdens. This was a further key feature of 
the international landscape that was expected to emerge. 
Nor was that all. There was a persistent fear of new conflicts as well. ‘The shadows of 
victory’ were upon Britain, as Churchill put it in early 1945.92 ‘After this war, continued the 
PM, we should be weak, we should have no money and no strength…’ In a telling remark, in 
May 1945 the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wrote of the end of the war with Germany 
that ‘I sometimes feel that we are entering a period like that of [the] second Balkan war 
transferred on to [the] world stage’.93 This was an alarmingly bleak appraisal. Churchill 
shared his concern about war with the Soviet Union and had been pondering this since the 
summer of 1944.94 The prime minister asked the Joint Planning Staff to draw up a plan for a 
hypothetical conflict with the Soviet ‘crocodile’ that would commence on 1 July 1945 and 
see Britain and the United States ally with Germany.95 Churchill also requested a plan to 
defend against a Soviet attack on western Europe.96 This fear drove his visit to Moscow in 
October 1944 where he sought to contain Stalin with the infamous ‘percentages agreement’. 
At Chequers in early 1945, Churchill mused that when Germany had been defeated, ‘what 
will lie between the white snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover? 97 There were 
rumours of rebellion among Conservative backbenchers over concessions in Poland.98 
Churchill warned the Kremlin that their ‘quarrel would tear the world apart’.99 He told 
Roosevelt and Truman that ‘utter breakdown’ was probable and planned a diplomatic 
‘showdown’ with Stalin, ‘on which the immediate future of the world depends’.100 By the 
spring of 1945, a very high proportion of Churchill’s personal telegrams were taken up with 
the USSR and the threat to European stability posed by the Red Army and its local proxies in 
a power vacuum. ‘The tide of Russian domination’ was ‘sweeping forward … on a front of 
300 or 400 miles’.101 This ‘constitutes an event in the history of Europe to which there has 
been no parallel’.102 On 4 May 1945, Churchill telegraphed to Eden his fear that there was 
 24 
‘very little [prospect] of preventing a third World War’.103 ‘Never in his life had he been 
more worried by the European situation…’104 
This was a nightmarish vision of war without end. Upon receiving news of the first American 
test of the atomic bomb, Alanbrooke recorded Churchill as being immediately excited and 
‘seeing himself capable of eliminating all the Russian centres of industry and population’ in 
the event of war: ‘if [the USSR] insist or doing this or that, well we can just blot out Moscow, 
then Stalingrad, then Kiev…’105 As the prime minister stressed, this planning was 
‘precautionary’;106 but from 1943 onwards, his position on national renewal cannot be 
adequately understood in isolation from his assessment of the wider context in which policy 
was made. The international and domestic realms need to be integrated if the public 
positioning of Conservative leaders – which proved to be so politically unprofitable in July 
1945 – is to be grasped. The two arenas were intertwined, as the eventual Conservative 
general election manifesto made clear. Indeed, the international dimension had been present 
from the outset in that post-war strategic commitments accounted for a substantial part of 
Wood’s Budget outlines. Therefore if we are to properly understand the divergence between 
Labour and Conservative positions after 1942, we need to consider the different set of 
coordinates that their leaders used in shaping policy. A projected long-term war in the 
Pacific, policing the defeated states after victory, and a feared conflict with the Soviet Union 
were sources of anxiety that made domestic commitments difficult to give. 
 
V 
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The refinement of arguments about renewal had established a consistent Conservative 
viewpoint. In 1944, this began to have an impact on the preparation of post-war policy. For 
instance, the 1944 Budget saw Anderson emphasise ‘important reliefs and reforms in favour 
of industry’, and he wanted the Excess Profits Tax (EPT) modified to allow companies to 
plan for the future with greater confidence.107 The Chancellor and his advisers focused on 
laying foundations for economic competitiveness.108 Anderson was convinced by Keynes’s 
argument that taxation was too high, and that ‘to put it [the revision of the EPT] off is a pure 
concession to misguided sentiment’.109 On the matter of encouraging research he told the 
Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, that ‘as you know, this whole subject is 
one which interests me profoundly and I am personally convinced that if we are to keep our 
place in the world industrially there will have to be a considerable increase in research in 
future … I therefore approach this topic with special sympathy’.110 It was Anderson’s 
intention ‘to give full weight’ to the problem. Economic efficiency thus remained the 
overriding goal. Prosperity would ‘establish a sound economic basis for that better and fuller 
future which we seek to attain’.111 The ‘better and fuller future’ – presumably a reference to 
expanded state provision – would have to wait for economic renewal. In his radio broadcast 
on the Budget, Anderson emphasised the likelihood of a prolonged conflict with Japan before 
declaring that ‘our first thought, after war ceases to claim all our efforts, must be the 
rebuilding of our peacetime economic life’.112 Relation to a definite temporal situation 
defined virtually all of these arguments. It was not the case, then, that leading Conservatives 
were failing to think about the future; they had engaged in some depth with the question of 
post-war Britain, its timeframes and horizons. Rather, they had identified different priorities 
from those of their political opponents. Edgerton’s critique of the restrictive effects of the 
‘social democratic historiography’ is a pertinent one. 
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Lyttelton developed the theme of technological research, rejecting the idea that ‘because the 
State in war is highly efficient in industry … the same applies in peace’.113 Instead he desired 
‘the marriage of the organising power of the state with the free play of private enterprise’.114 
The Minister of Production stressed that the adoption of modern technology in industry was 
the most important single aspect of prosperity and thus employment.115 The party’s 
Reconstruction Committee produced a detailed analysis of post-war industry in December 
1943, which took care to argue for ‘The Moral Basis of Enterprise’.116 Meanwhile Anderson 
ensured that the coalition’s 1944 White Paper, Employment Policy, was consistent with this 
theme. After laying out its aim as being the ‘maintenance of a high and stable level of 
employment’, the next paragraph in the White Paper made clear that this hinged upon 
exports, and went on that ‘employment cannot be created by act of Parliament or government 
action alone … government policy will be directed to bringing about conditions favourable to 
the maintenance of a high level of employment’.117 The Chancellor had committed the 
government to nothing more than seeking to create the conditions for low unemployment.118 
Employment Policy signalled that the government should stimulate the economy, but its 
ambitions were limited. Once again, for senior Conservatives the priority was creating a state 
of affairs in which prosperity could be encouraged and international trade resumed. 
 
VI 
 
The concepts refined from 1943 onwards help us to properly contextualise the public 
message of Conservative leaders ahead of the 1945 general election. It is important to 
emphasise that Churchill did not want an election, preferring to keep the coalition together 
for as long as possible and certainly until the defeat of Japan and the resolution of the Soviet 
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question. Even as late as 11 May 1945, he telegraphed to Eden in San Francisco that ‘the 
Russian peril, which I regard as enormous, could be better faced if we remain united’ and 
went on express his fear that with the Soviets boasting ‘hundreds of divisions’ and in 
‘possession of Europe from Lubeck to Trieste, and to the Greek frontier on the Adriatic’, 
there could be ‘a period of appeasement’ followed by ‘a third world war’.119 He told Truman 
that ‘the enormous Muscovite advance’ across Europe meant that ‘the issue of a settlement 
with Russia before our strength has gone [through demobilisation] seems to me to dwarf all 
others’.120 ‘If there is going to be trouble of this kind, the support of men like Attlee, Bevin 
[and] Morrison is indispensable’.121 However, the coalition government promptly collapsed 
when Labour insisted on an election. Historians have largely focused on the campaign itself, 
exploring the Conservative party’s organisational problems and the impact of Churchill’s 
‘Gestapo speech’.122 Michael Kandiah rightly noted that the campaign ‘failed at all levels’.123 
Churchill was still taken up with diplomacy and the drafting of the election manifesto was 
rushed.124 
Yet the manifesto itself needs to be placed in a long-term context. Despite its poor 
reception,125 we should not overlook the fact that the Conservatives’ programme was, in its 
essentials, consistent with the attitudes expressed publicly and privately by their leaders over 
the preceding two-and-a-half years. Importantly, the first three sections of Mr Churchill’s 
Declaration of Policy to the Electors all dealt with international and strategic issues. The 
manifesto began by stressing that ‘Britain is still at war, and must not turn aside from the vast 
further efforts still needed to bring Japan to the same end as Germany.’126 The anxiety felt by 
Churchill and Eden about the international situation was underlined as the document went on 
that ‘even when all foreign enemies are utterly defeated, that will not be the end of our task’, 
for Britain then had to ‘save the world from tyranny’. The source of this further ‘tyranny’ was 
not explicitly identified as the USSR, but the party had once again put forward the view that a 
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prolongation of international turmoil was likely. ‘Britain and the World’ was the first 
substantive section of the manifesto, followed by ‘The British Empire and Commonwealth’ 
and then ‘Defence’. The manifesto’s heavy emphasis on geopolitics conforms to what 
Churchill had told John Colville in March: that he was ‘prepared’ to put the Russian issue ‘to 
the House and the Country with confidence in their support’.127 
Churchill did not grasp that to most voters domestic matters were of greater importance than 
international wrangling. He had made the same mistake before. During the struggle over 
Indian constitutional reform in 1933, Lord Linlithgow warned Churchill that ‘you are … 
working yourself into a very poor tactical position’, for ‘the Indian problem does not interest 
the mass of voters in this country’.128 And in 1922 he had planned to fight a general election 
on a platform of confrontation with Turkey, another idea that backfired.129 
Nonetheless, it is striking that historians have never treated foreign policy as a major issue at 
the 1945 election – not least because it certainly was central to the Conservative message to 
the public, as a reading of the manifesto or Churchill’s speeches makes apparent. This is a 
clear indication of the extent to which the historiography has been led by a welfarist 
approach. Only after three sections on strategic problems did the manifesto turn to domestic 
matters. Here, the Conservatives promised to release personnel from the military as quickly 
as possible, pursue an ‘all-out housing policy’ and seek an agricultural renaissance. The 
manifesto identified ‘one of our most important tasks’ as being to introduce a scheme for 
‘nation-wide and compulsory … National Insurance’ which would facilitate ‘new and 
increased benefits’: pensions, family allowances and sickness benefits were all discussed. It 
went on that ‘we propose to create a comprehensive health service covering the whole range 
of medical treatment  … and to introduce legislation for this purpose in the new Parliament.’ 
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On the task of rebuilding the economy, the manifesto stated that ‘free enterprise must be 
given the chance and the encouragement to plan ahead. Confidence in sound government – 
mutual co-operation between industry and the State, rather than control by the State – a 
lightening of the burdens of excessive taxation – these are the first essentials.’ And ‘all that 
we long to achieve’ was dependent on ‘attaining the highest possible levels of peacetime 
production as fast as we can’. ‘The British people’ had to ‘fix their eyes’ on ‘production’. 
Nationalisation would produce new monopolies under state control, ‘with no proper 
protection for anyone’, especially ‘the consumers’ interest’. 
In a section on ‘Industrial Efficiency’, Anderson’s favoured themes of machinery and 
research were emphasised: 
The more efficient British industry is and the fuller the use it makes of modern methods and materials, the 
higher will be the standard of well-being that is possible for our people. We will stimulate scientific research in 
industry and in the universities, and encourage the scrapping of obsolete plant and methods in every possible 
way. 
The manifesto’s concluding message was stark. ‘The nation can have the services it is 
prepared to pay for. … The revenue is not created by waving a magic wand. It is drawn from 
the fruits of the nation’s industry, agriculture and commerce. It is won by work and paid in 
taxes.’ And it struck a classically conservative note in affirming that ‘progress must be 
extended and accelerated not by subordinating the individual to the authority of the State, but 
by providing the conditions in which no one shall be precluded by poverty, ignorance, 
insecurity, or the selfishness of others from making the best of the gifts with which 
Providence has endowed him.’130 Thus, the Conservative-run state would create only ‘the 
conditions’ for progress – while individual ‘Providence’ was allotted the same important role 
that it always occupied in conservative thought. Life would remain contingent and shaped by 
fortune. 
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VII 
 
Despite important efforts – most obviously by Steven Fielding – to qualify the ‘meaning’ of 
Labour’s landslide victory at the 1945 election, key elements of both academic and popular 
perceptions of this period have proven remarkably resistant to revision.131 The explanation 
seems obvious: Attlee’s triumph still represents the iconic political moment for the modern 
British intellectual left. It carries a potent emotional appeal, a fleeting alignment between 
Labour and the public which in turn facilitated the birth of a post-war social democratic 
order. The Beveridge report, and its view of national renewal, is an indispensable component 
of this story, the popularity of its proposals acting as a vital enabling factor for Labour. 
Moreover it is fair to say that Social Insurance and Allied Services and Labour’s victory have 
had many academic supporters, and few detractors; Corelli Barnett’s assault on the post-war 
order reflected a minority worldview. As a result, it is easy to see why the position adopted 
by Conservative leaders towards national renewal jars with the dominant ‘welfarist’ tradition 
within the historiography. The centrality of issues such as finance, trade and international 
turmoil to their arguments point to a more fluid and contested debate than the standard 
narrative that political debate in the second half of the war was one about welfare. 
Myths about Conservative obduracy towards reform, first crafted by Beveridge and Labour 
propaganda, are still common. For example, Richard Carr recently wrote that ‘Conservatives 
who had little constructive to say – Churchill and Kingsley Wood were the prime examples – 
used the war quite adeptly as an excuse for saying nothing’.132 But, as this article has 
demonstrated, these views are difficult to sustain and should be dispensed with. It may appear 
that Conservative leaders were simply stalling if the Labour view of national renewal is 
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accepted as marking out the legitimate boundaries of debate; but within the Conservatives’ 
own worldview, that does not square with the evidence. Few politicians were as energetic as 
Wood in working through the practicalities of national renewal, a fact which underlines the 
Chancellor’s status as one of the crucial, yet neglected, figures of wartime politics. 
Meanwhile Churchill thought long and hard about the post-war international landscape, and 
sought – unsuccessfully – to communicate his anxieties to the public. One-dimensional 
depictions of the Conservative position provide succour to a social democratic view of 
developments, but actually tell us very little about how Conservative leaders themselves 
discerned the future. 
The Conservative manifesto clearly lacked the appealing vision of that of the Labour party. A 
future of burdensome international dangers, economic uncertainty and incremental progress 
in social reform did not fire the imagination. But the document was consistent with a series of 
arguments developed by Conservative leaders from 1942 onwards. The programme placed 
before the electorate expressed their sense that, in an environment of continuing warfare, 
‘tyranny’ and economic dislocation, priorities for state action would need to be carefully 
selected. Mr Churchill’s Declaration of Policy to the Electors also reflected anxiety that any 
equilibrium between these competing claims could actually be found. In grappling with the 
practicalities of national renewal the party’s senior figures had explored ‘the future’ with a 
seriousness that historians – focused on the Beveridge report – have not always allowed. 
In turn this suggests a need to modify the popular suspicion that in resisting Beveridge the 
Conservatives were quietly hoping to recreate a Dickensian world of small state and minimal 
social provision.133 One of the most significant developments within recent historiography of 
this period has been the emergence of new narratives to challenge the old. Edgerton, 
particularly, has attempted to complicate matters by showing that outside ‘experts’ from 
business were far more influential in Whitehall than (better known) social-democratic 
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intellectuals.134 The polity that emerged from the war was highly interventionist on a range of 
fronts. Government as a whole had new horizons, irrespective of exactly how different parties 
sought to proceed. Ben Jackson has demonstrated how even early neo-liberal thinkers were 
interventionists and agreed upon the importance of welfare.135 Moreover, the Conservative 
party had rarely been genuinely in hoc to free-market ideology.136 What had shifted since the 
1930s, though, was public demand. In a nation already being shaped by memories of that 
decade, the electorate would countenance no return to the world of The Town That Was 
Murdered.137 Britain was also undergoing a change in collective attitudes towards material 
satisfaction.138 The voters now had different views of the availability of public money. The 
Labour party proved more willing to feed these at the election. It would take the Conservative 
party several years to adapt. 
This article has delineated how senior Conservatives responded to the problem of securing 
national renewal. It was an important moment of transition for the role of the state in a liberal 
democracy, and the Conservative position was more sophisticated than has usually been 
recognised. For Enoch Powell and other Conservatives these developments amounted to a 
revolution in the party’s outlook.139 Powell was perhaps thinking not only of the 
commitments made by Churchill, but calls such as that from Robert Boothby in 1943 for state 
control over credit and external trade in the post-war era, wide-ranging government 
interference in the market to stimulate productivity, and the establishment of an Economic 
General Staff.140 
Far from being well-developed or fixed, the conceptual vocabularies of the period were in 
flux; the meaning of phrases such as ‘renewal’, ‘reform’ and ‘reconstruction’ was uncertain 
and malleable. Indeed the struggle to find satisfactory definitions arguably provided much of 
the motive force of subsequent developments. For men like Anderson, Churchill and Wood 
the issues were frequently temporal – a question of timing – rather than spatial, in the form of 
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debates about the frontiers of the welfare state. Much political argument has an important 
temporal component, hinging as it does on advancing points about the short- and long-term, 
the distribution of goods (and pain) across time, the rationale of prudence, the risk of 
premature gratification, and so on. The speed of the journey towards a desirable horizon, and 
what can be done en route, is often as significant as the destination itself. The Conservative 
stance on national renewal in the latter half of the war is a useful example of how politics can 
revolve around this. To the Conservative leaders’ way of thinking, there was a danger that 
recovery would be undermined by the impatience of the demos. Conservatives believed that 
the rhetoric of Beveridge and Labour implied a ‘Golden Age’; theirs, in contrast, was rooted 
in the here-and-now at home and abroad. That the rejection of these warnings at the ballot 
box came as a surprise to much of the party only underlined that Churchill and those around 
him had lost sight of political realities. But then their message was never likely to be ‘music 
to the ears’ of an exhausted nation.141 
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